InterNull: Achieving Cross-Chain Transaction Privacy Through ECDSA One-Time Signatures

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Abstract

We present InterNull, a blockchain privacy protocol that achieves transaction unlinkability through Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) one-time signatures (OTS). Unlike immutable zero-knowledge mixers that prevent regulatory compliance, InterNull introduces a **Federated Privacy Model**. While transactions remain cryptographically unlinkable to on-chain observers, the Distributed Key Generation (DKG) committee retains a threshold capability to reconstruct transaction graphs. This enables a **selective de-anonymization mechanism** where a quorum of nodes (t-of-n) can cooperate to identify illicit funds without compromising the privacy of legitimate users.

The protocol enables multi-chain privacy via deferred, chain-specific key allocation and fixed-denomination multi-key splitting. We analyze security under a bounded exposure window defined by **blockchain slot latency** ($t_{slot} \ll$ any practical ECDLP break), ensuring forward secrecy against future quantum adversaries. Threshold DKG pre-computes Merkle trees of withdrawal public keys, yielding fast withdrawals (~85% lower gas than zk-SNARK mixers). Deployments on Ethereum, BNB Chain, Base, and Solana validate the protocol's performance and its unique position as a bridge between DeFi privacy and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) compliance.

Keywords: *blockchain privacy, one-time signatures, cross-chain protocols, distributed key generation, quantum resistance, ECDSA, cryptocurrency mixers, privacy-preserving transactions*

1. Introduction

The transparency inherent in blockchain architectures, while essential for trustless verification, presents significant privacy challenges for practical adoption [1]. Every transaction on public blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum is permanently recorded and visible to all participants, creating a complete financial history that can be analyzed indefinitely. This transparency, originally designed as a feature to prevent double-spending and ensure accountability, has become a critical barrier for institutional adoption, personal privacy, and commercial confidentiality [2].

Current privacy-preserving protocols predominantly rely on zero-knowledge proof systems, particularly zk-SNARKs (Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge) [3] and zk-STARKs (Zero-Knowledge Scalable Transparent Arguments of Knowledge) [4]. These cryptographic techniques allow one party to prove knowledge of information without revealing the information itself. However, these solutions impose substantial computational overhead, with proof generation times exceeding 30 seconds on consumer hardware [5] and gas costs that can reach hundreds of dollars during network congestion [6]. Additionally, many zero-knowledge systems require trusted setup ceremonies, introducing potential security vulnerabilities and limiting their practical deployment.

We introduce InterNull, a privacy protocol that achieves transaction unlinkability through a novel application of ECDSA one-time signatures in blockchain environments. Our approach leverages the unique properties of blockchain

finality (the point at which transactions become irreversible) to transform standard ECDSA into a quantum-resistant OTS scheme. By combining this with distributed key generation, we eliminate single points of trust while enabling features impractical in existing systems: fixed-denomination multi-key splitting (rather than arbitrary variable withdrawals), multi-chain privacy through independent chain pools, and sub-second authorization.

1.1 Contributions

Our primary contributions are:

- A formal framework for using ECDSA as an OTS scheme in blockchain environments, providing practical quantum resistance through bounded attack windows
- A distributed key generation protocol that pre-computes Merkle trees of withdrawal keys, enabling constant-time signature creation and logarithmic verification (Merkle proof + ECDSA)
- A fixed-denomination multi-key splitting mechanism (large deposits redeemed as multiple standard pool withdrawals to avoid unique fractional patterns)
- A multi-chain architecture with chain-specific key generation, enabling deposit-withdrawal privacy across different blockchains without requiring cross-chain state synchronization
- Implementation and evaluation on multiple blockchain networks (Ethereum, BNB Chain, Base, and Solana) demonstrating 85% gas cost reduction compared to zk-SNARK alternatives
- Formal security proofs and empirical validation of the protocol's privacy guarantees and quantum resistance properties

1.2 Paper Organization

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides comprehensive background on blockchain privacy and cryptographic primitives. Section 3 surveys related work, comparing existing privacy protocols across multiple dimensions. Section 4 presents our system model and threat assumptions. Section 5 details the ECDSA-OTS construction and its security properties. Section 6 describes the distributed key generation protocol. Section 7 covers the multi-chain architecture. Section 8 presents our implementation. Section 9 provides experimental evaluation. Section 10 offers a detailed comparison with existing protocols. Section 11 discusses limitations and future work, and Section 12 concludes.

2. Background and Preliminaries

2.1 Blockchain Fundamentals

A blockchain is a distributed ledger consisting of a sequence of blocks $\mathcal{B} = \{B_0, B_1, \ldots, B_n\}$, where each block B_i contains a set of transactions $\mathcal{T}_i = \{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_m\}$ and a cryptographic hash linking it to the previous block B_{i-1}. The key properties relevant to our protocol are:

- **Transparency:** All transactions are publicly visible and permanently recorded
- **Immutability:** Once confirmed, transactions cannot be altered without controlling >51% of the network's computational power
- **Finality:** After a certain number of confirmations (varying by blockchain), transactions are considered irreversible
- **Pseudonymity:** Users are identified by addresses derived from public keys, not real names

A critical distinction for our security model is the difference between Slot Time and Finality:

- **Slot Time (t_{slot}):** The fixed time interval allocated for a validator to propose a block (e.g., 12 seconds on Ethereum). This represents the primary "exposure window" for our OTS keys.
- **Finality (T_{final}):** The point at which transactions become economically irreversible (e.g., ~12.8 minutes / 2 epochs for Ethereum's Casper FFG).

- **Inclusion Latency:** The time from transaction broadcast to inclusion in a block, typically one or two slots.

2.2 The Privacy Challenge in Blockchains

While blockchain addresses provide pseudonymity, they do not provide privacy. Transaction graph analysis can reveal:

- **Address Clustering:** Multiple addresses belonging to the same entity can be linked through transaction patterns [7]
- **Amount Correlation:** Unique transaction amounts can be traced across the network
- **Timing Analysis:** Transaction timestamps reveal usage patterns and geographic locations
- **Exchange Attribution:** Cryptocurrency exchanges perform KYC (Know Your Customer), linking addresses to real identities

2.3 Cryptographic Primitives

2.3.1 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

ECDSA is the primary signature scheme used in Bitcoin, Ethereum, and most blockchains. It operates over an elliptic curve E defined by the equation:

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p} \tag{1}$$

where p is a large prime. The security relies on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP): given points P and $Q = kP$ on the curve, finding the scalar k is computationally infeasible.

2.3.2 One-Time Signatures (OTS)

A one-time signature scheme allows a signing key to be used only once. After a single use, the security of the signature is no longer guaranteed. Lamport signatures [8] are the classical example, using hash functions to create signatures that are information-theoretically secure for single use.

2.3.3 Merkle Trees

A Merkle tree is a binary tree where each leaf node contains a data hash, and each non-leaf node contains the hash of its children. This structure allows efficient proof of membership with O(log n) proof size, where n is the number of leaves.

3. Related Work

3.1 Overview of Privacy Approaches

Privacy solutions in blockchain can be categorized into three main approaches: cryptographic mixing, zero-knowledge proofs, and protocol-level privacy. We survey each category, analyzing their trade-offs in terms of privacy guarantees, computational efficiency, and practical deployment considerations.



Figure 1: Comparison of privacy protocols based on computational complexity and privacy strength. InterNull achieves strong privacy with lower computational overhead than zero-knowledge solutions.

3.2 Protocol-Level Privacy: Monero and Ring Signatures

Monero [9] represents the most successful deployment of protocol-level privacy in cryptocurrency. It employs a multi-layered approach:

- **Ring Signatures:** Hide the true sender among a set of possible signers (ring members). Current ring size is 16, providing a 1/16 probability of identifying the true sender.
- **RingCT (Ring Confidential Transactions):** Conceals transaction amounts using Pedersen commitments and range proofs.
- **Stealth Addresses:** Generate one-time addresses for each transaction, preventing address reuse and linkability.

Advantages: Monero provides privacy by default for all transactions, creating a large anonymity set. The protocol is battle-tested with over 10 years of operation.

Limitations: Transaction sizes are approximately 10× larger than Bitcoin due to ring signatures and range proofs. The protocol is limited to a single blockchain with no cross-chain capability. Recent research has shown that up to 30% of transactions before 2017 could be traced through temporal analysis [10]. Additionally, many exchanges have delisted Monero due to regulatory concerns.

3.3 Optional Privacy: Zcash and zk-SNARKs

Zcash [11] pioneered the use of zero-knowledge proofs for cryptocurrency privacy, offering both transparent and shielded transactions:

- **Transparent Addresses (t-addresses):** Function like Bitcoin addresses with full transparency
- **Shielded Addresses (z-addresses):** Use zk-SNARKs to hide sender, receiver, and amount
- **Sapling Upgrade:** Reduced proof generation time from ~40 seconds to ~7 seconds
- **Orchard Upgrade:** Introduced Halo 2, eliminating the trusted setup requirement

Technical Foundation: Zcash uses a commitment scheme where coins are represented as notes:

$\text{note} = (\text{value}, \text{owner}, \rho)$, where ρ is a unique nullifier. When spending, users prove knowledge of a note without revealing it.

Privacy Analysis: Despite strong cryptographic guarantees, only ~5% of Zcash transactions use shielded pools [12], limiting the effective anonymity set. The optional privacy model creates distinct transaction patterns that can leak information. Network-level analysis can correlate transparent and shielded transactions.

3.4 Smart Contract Privacy: Mixing Protocols

3.4.1 Tornado Cash and Fixed Denominations

Tornado Cash [13] (prior to sanctions in 2022) implemented a non-custodial mixing service using zk-SNARKs on Ethereum:

- **Fixed Denominations:** Pools of 0.1, 1, 10, and 100 ETH to maximize anonymity sets
- **Commitment-Nullifier Scheme:** Deposits create a commitment $C = H(\text{secret}, \text{nullifier})$
- **Withdrawal Proofs:** Zero-knowledge proof of knowing a commitment in the Merkle tree

Limitations: The protocol faced regulatory action leading to smart contract sanctions. Fixed denominations created identifiable patterns for large amounts. Relayer dependence introduced privacy risks as relayers could correlate IP addresses with transactions. Gas costs for proof verification averaged $50-100 during peak usage.

3.4.2 Aztec Protocol: Private DeFi

Aztec [14] extends privacy to DeFi applications through a Layer-2 rollup architecture:

- **PLONK Proving System:** More efficient than Groth16, enabling complex computations
- **Private Bridges:** Connect to public DeFi protocols while maintaining privacy
- **Programmable Privacy:** Developers can build private applications using Noir language

Trade-offs: Requires bridging assets to Layer-2, introducing liquidity fragmentation. Withdrawal delays of 1-7 days impact usability. Limited ecosystem compared to Layer-1 Ethereum.

3.5 Alternative Approaches

3.5.1 MimbleWimble and Transaction Cut-Through

MimbleWimble [15], implemented in Grin and Beam, uses a novel approach:

- **Confidential Transactions:** Amounts hidden using Pedersen commitments
- **Transaction Cut-Through:** Intermediate transactions can be removed from the blockchain
- **No Addresses:** Transactions are built interactively between sender and receiver

Privacy Properties: Provides good transaction graph obfuscation but requires interactive transactions, limiting usability. The protocol is vulnerable to network-level surveillance of transaction building.

3.5.2 CoinJoin and Collaborative Transactions

CoinJoin [16] protocols (Wasabi, Samourai, JoinMarket) coordinate multiple users to create joint transactions:

- **Equal Output Amounts:** Makes it difficult to link inputs to outputs
- **Coordinator Models:** Centralized (Wasabi) vs. Decentralized (JoinMarket)
- **Chaumian CoinJoin:** Uses blind signatures to prevent coordinator from linking users

Limitations: Requires active participation and coordination among users. Anonymity set limited to participants in each round (typically 50-100). Vulnerable to Sybil attacks where adversaries participate with multiple identities. Chain analysis companies have developed techniques to partially trace CoinJoin transactions [17].

3.6 Comparative Analysis



Figure 2: Radar chart comparing key features across privacy protocols. InterNull achieves balanced performance across all dimensions.

Protocol	Privacy Model	Technology	Multi-Chain	Quantum Resistant
InterNull	Unlinkability	ECDSA-OTS	Chain-Specific Keys	Practical
Monero	Default Privacy	Ring Signatures	No	No
Zcash	Optional Privacy	zk-SNARKs	No	No
Tornado Cash	Mixer	zk-SNARKs	No	No
Aztec	L2 Privacy	PLONK	Bridge Required	No
MimbleWimble	Protocol Privacy	CT + Cut-through	No	No
CoinJoin	Collaborative	Transaction mixing	No	No

3.7 Key Insights from Related Work

Our analysis of existing privacy protocols reveals several critical insights that inform the design of InterNull:

1. **Computational Complexity vs. Privacy:** Zero-knowledge proofs provide strong privacy guarantees but at significant computational cost. Ring signatures offer moderate privacy with better performance but poor scalability.
2. **Adoption Barriers:** Optional privacy (Zcash) suffers from low adoption, reducing effective anonymity. Default privacy (Monero) faces regulatory challenges and exchange delistings.
3. **Multi-Chain Limitations:** No existing protocol provides seamless multi-chain privacy; most require bridges or wrapped assets, creating liquidity fragmentation.
4. **Quantum Vulnerability:** All major privacy protocols rely on cryptographic assumptions vulnerable to quan-

tum computers, with no practical migration path.

5. **Regulatory Pressure:** Tornado Cash sanctions demonstrate the need for privacy solutions that balance user privacy with regulatory compliance capabilities.

InterNull provides an alternative approach that leverages blockchain finality properties to enable one-time signatures, achieving privacy without complex zero-knowledge proofs while maintaining practical quantum resistance and multi-chain operability through independent chain-specific privacy pools.

4. System Model and Threat Assumptions

4.1 System Architecture

InterNull operates on a distributed architecture comprising three primary components: users, distributed key generation (DKG) nodes, and smart contracts deployed across multiple blockchain networks.



Figure 3: InterNull system architecture showing the three-layer design with user interactions, distributed key generation, and multi-chain smart contracts.

Let $\mathcal{N} = \{N_1, N_2, \ldots, N_n\}$ represent the set of DKG nodes, where each node N_i maintains a share of the master key generation secret. The threshold t defines the minimum number of nodes required for key generation consensus, where $t \leq n$. The system maintains the following invariants:

- No single node can generate valid withdrawal keys independently
- Any t nodes can collaboratively generate keys
- The protocol remains secure against up to $t - 1$ Byzantine nodes

4.2 Threat Model

We assume an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ with the following capabilities:

- **Passive observation:** Complete visibility of all blockchain transactions across all supported chains
- **Active participation:** Ability to create deposits and withdrawals
- **Node compromise:** Control of up to $t - 1$ DKG nodes (Byzantine fault tolerance)
- **Network analysis:** Ability to analyze transaction patterns, timing correlations, and network traffic
- **Computational resources:** Access to classical computing clusters and near-term quantum computers (50-100 qubits)

We explicitly exclude adversaries capable of:

- Breaking the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) in time less than block finality
- Controlling $\geq t$ DKG nodes simultaneously
- Reversing block finality on the underlying blockchain (51% attack)
- Breaking standard cryptographic hash functions (SHA-256, Keccak-256)

4.3 Security Goals

InterNull aims to achieve the following security properties:

> **Definition 1 (Unlinkability):** An adversary observing deposits $D = \{d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n\}$ and withdrawals $W = \{w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_m\}$ cannot determine which deposit corresponds to which withdrawal with probability better than random guessing: $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D, W) = \text{link}(d_i, w_j)] \leq \frac{1}{|D|}$

> **Definition 2 (Denomination Splitting Privacy):** Individual withdrawal denominations are public and fixed. A user's original deposit amount and its decomposition into multiple standard withdrawals (possibly across chains and times) is indistinguishable from independent deposits of those denominations, up to leakage from timing, chain liquidity, or DKG metadata.

> **Definition 3 (Multi-Chain Privacy):** When a user deposits on Chain A and withdraws on Chain B using keys allocated (and thereby bound) off-chain to B, linkage is infeasible via on-chain data alone given independent nullifier spaces and sufficient anonymity sets per (chain, denomination).

> **Definition 4 (Conditional Auditability):** While the protocol guarantees unlinkability against external adversaries $\mathcal{A}_{ext}$, it permits **threshold traceability** for the DKG committee. A quorum of t nodes can cryptographically reconstruct the mapping $D \to W$. This property ensures that privacy is maintained by default, but audit trails exist for governance or legal compliance.

Assumption (DKG Non-Collusion): Fewer than t DKG nodes collude to retain or disclose allocation logs mapping deposit identifiers to allocated (chain, denomination, key indices).

5. ECDSA as a One-Time Signature Scheme

5.1 Standard ECDSA

The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm operates over an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_p$. Given a generator point G of order n, the signature generation for message m with private key $d \in [1, n-1]$ proceeds as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
k &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n^* \quad \text{(random nonce)} \\
(x_1, y_1) &= k \cdot G \\
r &= x_1 \bmod n \\
s &= k^{-1}(H(m) + r \cdot d) \bmod n
\end{aligned}
\tag{2}
$$

where $H : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{Z}_n$ is a cryptographic hash function. The signature is the pair (r, s).

5.2 One-Time Usage Constraint

In the InterNull protocol, we enforce a one-time usage constraint through on-chain tracking:

> **Definition 5 (ECDSA-OTS):** An ECDSA one-time signature scheme is a tuple $(\mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Verify}, \mathsf{Consume})$ where:
>
> - $\mathsf{KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \to (sk, pk)$: generates a key pair
> - $\mathsf{Sign}(sk, m) \to \sigma$: produces a signature
> - $\mathsf{Verify}(pk, m, \sigma) \to \{0, 1\}$: verifies a signature
> - $\mathsf{Consume}(pk) \to \perp$: marks the public key as used on-chain

5.3 Quantum Resistance Analysis

Our quantum resistance claim relies on the discrepancy between block slot times and quantum decryption speeds.

> **Theorem 1:** Given a blockchain with slot duration t_{slot} and an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ capable of solving ECDLP in time T_{ECDLP}, the ECDSA-OTS scheme is secure if $t_{slot} < T_{ECDLP}$.

> **Proof:** In Ethereum (Proof-of-Stake), time is divided into 12-second slots. While "Finality" (Casper FFG) takes ~12.8 minutes, the effective attack window is the **Slot Time**. For an adversary to exploit a revealed key, they must (1) observe the key in a pending withdrawal tx_v, (2) derive sk, and (3) front-run tx_v with a competing transaction tx_a within the same or next slot.
>
> If $T_{ECDLP} \gg 12s$, the key is effectively secure because the legitimate transaction tx_v will be included in a block before the adversary can derive the key. Once included, displacing the transaction requires a chain reorganization, which is economically infeasible for deep history. Thus, the security relies on inclusion speed, not finality. □

Quantum Attack Window Analysis



Figure 4: Quantum attack timeline showing the massive gap between block creation time (12 seconds) and the time required for quantum computers to break ECDSA (>10^6 seconds).

6. Distributed Key Generation Protocol

6.1 Protocol Overview

The distributed key generation protocol ensures no single entity can generate withdrawal keys, providing trust minimization and censorship resistance. The protocol operates in three phases:

1. **Initialization:** Nodes establish threshold parameters and communication channels
2. **Key Generation:** Collaborative generation of withdrawal key pairs
3. **Merkle Tree Construction:** Building and publishing the commitment tree

6.2 Threshold Key Generation

We employ a (t, n)-threshold scheme where any t out of n nodes can generate keys:

$$\text{Secret share: } s_i = f(i) \text{ where } f(x) = a_0 + a_1 x + \ldots + a_{t-1} x^{t-1} \tag{3}$$

Each node N_i receives a share s_i of the master secret. Key generation requires:

- At least t nodes contribute their shares
- Lagrange interpolation to reconstruct the key generation function
- Verification that generated keys match the published Merkle root

6.3 Merkle Tree Construction

Pre-generated keys are organized in a Merkle tree for efficient verification:



Figure 5: Merkle tree structure for withdrawal keys. The highlighted path shows the proof required to verify Key_2 against the root hash.

7. Multi-Chain Architecture

7.1 Chain-Specific Key Generation

InterNull operates as independent privacy pools on each supported blockchain, with keys generated specifically for each chain. This architecture eliminates the complexity of cross-chain state synchronization while maintaining privacy guarantees:

1. **Deposit Phase:** User deposits funds on Chain A (e.g., Ethereum), specifying the denomination and token
2. **Key Request:** User requests withdrawal keys for a specific denomination on a specific target chain (which may be the same or different from the deposit chain)
3. **Chain-Specific Keys:** Generated keys are valid only on the requested chain, preventing reuse attacks
4. **Independent Operation:** Each chain maintains its own nullifier set with no cross-chain synchronization required

7.2 Multi-Chain Privacy Model

The chain-specific design provides several advantages:

- **No State Synchronization:** Each chain operates independently, eliminating cross-chain coordination overhead
- **Simplified Security Model:** No risk of double-spending keys across chains since keys are chain-specific
- **Deposit-Withdrawal Unlinkability:** Depositing on Chain A and withdrawing on Chain B breaks on-chain linkability
- **Flexible Liquidity:** Users can choose withdrawal chain based on fees, speed, or privacy requirements

This architecture allows users to deposit funds on one chain (e.g., Ethereum with high liquidity) and receive keys for withdrawal on another chain (e.g., Base with lower fees), achieving multi-chain privacy through separate anonymity sets rather than shared key pools.

7.3 Denomination Splitting Semantics

Users optionally request multiple fixed-denomination keys (e.g., deposit 1 ETH → two 0.5 ETH keys or ten 0.1 ETH keys). Arbitrary fractional outputs (e.g., 0.5005) are disallowed to prevent unique sum patterns. Privacy relies on: (i) high active counts per denomination per chain, (ii) temporal separation of redemptions, (iii) optional cross-chain distribution. Recommended practice: avoid redeeming all split keys in a narrow time window or same block; use chain fee differentials to diversify withdrawal surfaces.

8. Implementation

8.1 Smart Contract Architecture

The InterNull protocol is implemented through a modular smart contract system:

```
contract InterNullPool {
    mapping(bytes32 => bool) public nullifiers;
    bytes32 public merkleRoot;
    uint256 public totalDeposits;

    function deposit(address token, uint256 amount) external payable {
        require(amount > 0, "Invalid amount");
        if (token == address(0)) {
            require(msg.value == amount, "ETH mismatch");
        } else {
            IERC20(token).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
        }
        totalDeposits += amount;
```

```
        emit Deposit(msg.sender, token, amount);
    }

    function withdraw(
        address token,
        uint256 amount,
        bytes32 nullifier,
        bytes32[] calldata merkleProof,
        address recipient,
        bytes calldata signature
    ) external {
        require(!nullifiers[nullifier], "Already withdrawn");
        require(verifyMerkleProof(merkleProof, nullifier), "Invalid proof");
        require(verifySignature(nullifier, recipient, signature), "Invalid signature");

        nullifiers[nullifier] = true;
        if (token == address(0)) {
            payable(recipient).transfer(amount);
        } else {
            IERC20(token).transfer(recipient, amount);
        }
        emit Withdrawal(recipient, token, amount, nullifier);
    }

    function verifyMerkleProof(
        bytes32[] calldata proof,
        bytes32 leaf
    ) internal view returns (bool) {
        bytes32 computedHash = leaf;
        for (uint256 i = 0; i < proof.length; i++) {
            computedHash = keccak256(
                abi.encodePacked(
                    computedHash < proof[i] ? computedHash : proof[i],
                    computedHash < proof[i] ? proof[i] : computedHash
                )
            );
        }
        return computedHash == merkleRoot;
    }
}
```

8.2 Gas Cost Optimization

Several optimizations reduce gas consumption:

- **Batch Operations:** Multiple withdrawals can be processed in a single transaction
- **Storage Packing:** Efficient use of storage slots for nullifier tracking
- **Merkle Proof Compression:** Optimized proof format reducing calldata costs

9. Experimental Evaluation

9.1 Experimental Setup

We deployed InterNull on four major blockchain networks:

- **Ethereum Mainnet:** High security, high fees, 12-second finality
- **BNB Chain:** Lower fees, 3-second blocks, different validator set
- **Base:** L2 solution with very low fees and fast finality
- **Solana:** High throughput, sub-second finality, different consensus mechanism

9.2 Performance Comparison

Metric	InterNull	Tornado Cash	Aztec	Monero	Zcash
Proof Generation	<1s	~45s	~30s	N/A	~7s
Gas Cost (USD)	$8-12	$50-100	$30-60	N/A	N/A
Withdrawal Time	Instant	~1 min	1-7 days	~20 min	~10 min
Multi-Chain	Independent Pools	No	Bridge Required	No	No
Anonymity Set	10^3-10^4	10^3-10^4	10^2-10^3	16	Variable
Setup Required	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes*

*Zcash Orchard eliminated trusted setup but still requires parameter generation

10. Security Analysis

10.1 Formal Security Properties

> **Theorem 2 (Unlinkability):** Under the ECDLP hardness assumption and honest majority of DKG nodes, InterNull achieves computational unlinkability between deposits and withdrawals.

> Consider an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ attempting to link deposit transaction d_i to withdrawal transaction w_j. The adversary observes:
>
> - On-chain deposit: $(addr_i, amount_i, tx_i)$ where $addr_i$ is the depositor's address
> - On-chain withdrawal: $(pk_j, amount_j, \sigma_j, \pi_j)$ where pk_j is the withdrawal key public key, σ_j is the ECDSA signature, and π_j is the Merkle proof
>
> The key allocation process occurs off-chain through authenticated requests to DKG nodes. For $\mathcal{A}$ to link d_i and w_j, they must determine which withdrawal keys $\{(sk_k, pk_k)\}_{k \in K}$ were allocated to deposit d_i. This requires either:
>
> 1. **On-chain correlation:** Link $addr_i$ to pk_j through transaction patterns. However, pk_j is independently generated from pre-computed DKG pool with no cryptographic connection to $addr_i$.
> 2. **Off-chain observation:** Observe the key allocation request. However, requests are authenticated through signatures and transmitted over secure channels to DKG nodes. An adversary observing network traffic sees encrypted messages.

3. **DKG node compromise:** Control $\geq t$ DKG nodes to learn key allocations. This violates the honest majority assumption where at most $t-1$ nodes are compromised.
4. **Timing correlation:** Correlate deposit timestamp t_{d_i} with withdrawal timestamp t_{w_j}. This provides only probabilistic linkage based on the anonymity set $\mathcal{A}_i = \{d_k : |t_{d_k} - t_{w_j}| < \Delta t\}$, where the probability of correct linkage is at most $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{A}_i|}$.

Under the assumptions that (i) fewer than t DKG nodes are compromised, (ii) the anonymity set size $|\mathcal{A}_i| \gg 1$, and (iii) secure communication channels protect key allocation requests, we have:

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(d_i, w_j) = \text{linked}] \leq \frac{1}{|\mathcal{A}_i|} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where the negligible term accounts for cryptographic assumptions (ECDLP hardness, secure channel security) and λ is the security parameter. □

10.2 Attack Vectors and Mitigations

Attack Vector	Description	Mitigation
Timing Analysis	Correlating deposits and withdrawals by time	Random delays, batched withdrawals
Amount Correlation	Matching unique amounts across chains	Fixed denominations + multi-key temporal / cross-chain dispersion
Sybil Attack	Creating fake deposits to reduce anonymity	Minimum deposit requirements
DKG Collusion	Multiple nodes colluding to track users	Threshold security, node rotation
Quantum Attack	Future quantum computers breaking ECDSA	Bounded attack window via finality

11. Discussion and Future Work

11.1 Advantages Over Existing Systems

InterNull's approach offers several practical advantages:

- **Computational Efficiency:** O(1) signature generation versus O(n log n) for ZK proofs
- **No Trusted Setup:** Eliminates ceremony-based parameter generation
- **Multi-Chain Support:** Chain-specific keys enable deposit-withdrawal privacy across different blockchains without cross-chain synchronization complexity
- **Practical Quantum Resistance:** Bounded attack window provides security against near-term quantum threats
- **Regulatory Flexibility:** Optional compliance features without compromising privacy

11.2 Limitations

The protocol has certain limitations that should be acknowledged:

- **Key Management:** Users must securely store withdrawal keys
- **Amount Visibility:** Denominations are visible on-chain, though linkability is prevented
- **Trust Assumptions:** Initial deployment requires trust in threshold nodes

- **Network Effects:** Privacy improves with more users (larger anonymity sets)

11.3 Future Research Directions

Several research directions emerge from this work:

1. **Post-Quantum Migration:** Integration of lattice-based signatures for long-term security
2. **Dynamic Denominations:** Machine learning for optimal denomination selection
3. **Layer-2 Integration:** Extending privacy to rollups and state channels
4. **Formal Verification:** Mathematical proofs of smart contract correctness
5. **Privacy Metrics:** Quantitative measures of anonymity set effectiveness

12. Conclusion

We have presented InterNull, a protocol that represents a pragmatic evolution in blockchain privacy architecture. By moving beyond the binary choice of "absolute transparency" (Bitcoin) versus "absolute anonymity" (Tornado Cash, ZCash, Monero), InterNull establishes a **"Third Way"**: a Federated Privacy Model that offers **On-Chain Opacity with Conditional Auditability**.

Technically, the protocol demonstrates that heavy zero-knowledge circuits are not the only path to unlinkability. By leveraging **ECDSA One-Time Signatures** and the inclusion speed of modern consensus mechanisms (**Slot Time**), we achieve an 85% reduction in gas costs and sub-second authorization times. This efficiency makes privacy accessible for high-frequency usage rather than just high-value transfers. Our security analysis confirms that relying on "Bounded Exposure Windows" based on slot latency provides a robust defense against future quantum adversaries, offering forward secrecy without the performance overhead of post-quantum cryptography.

Strategically, InterNull solves the "Compliance Paradox" that has hindered institutional DeFi adoption. We have transformed the traditional weakness of a committee-based system, namely the reliance on trust, into a critical feature. The DKG committee functions not merely as a key generator, but as a **Governance Layer** capable of enforcing an **Ingress Firewall** against illicit funds and executing **Threshold Traceability** when legally necessary.

As the regulatory landscape tightens around "ungovernable" code, InterNull provides a blueprint for sustainable privacy. It preserves the user's right to financial confidentiality while maintaining the ecosystem's integrity against abuse, paving the way for regulated entities to participate securely in decentralized finance.

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